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"The markets were deliberately taken down by a systematic 
and highly skillful attack" said George Winston, a charac-
ter in Tom Clancy's recent novel Debt of Honor. The "attack," 
however, was not one of bombs or bullets, it was much more 
subtle: a computer virus corrupts the New York Stock Exchange's 
electronic records and millions of transactions are wiped out. But 
as in every Clancy novel, clever people devise ingenious ways to 
counteract the assault. Of course the good guys win in the end. 
Life can and does imitate art from time to time but often 
without the happy ending. American commerce and government 
is dependent upon millions of computers, most of which are 
vulnerable to cybersubversion. 
With computers internationally linked by a bewildering 
number of cross-connections, tracking down a computer-attacker 
can be a profoundly difficult task. Suppose, however, that the 
source of the techno-assault against the Stock Exchange is 
definitively identified as emanating from the headquarters of the 
intelligence service of a hostile foreign government. Moreover, 
suppose the hostile government claims responsibility and threat-
ens further cyber-assaults if its demands are not met. Can the 
U.S., consonant with the United Nations Charter, launch a bevy 
of smart bombs or cruise missiles against the offending facility? 
The answer is hardly a resounding "yes," and more likely a 
qualified "no." The adoption of the UN Charter in 1945 had the 
effect of rendering obsolete traditional notions of "acts of war." 
The Charter was designed to eliminate the threat or use of force 
from international affairs. For example, under Article 2(3) of the 
Charter the signatories have agreed to settle their disputes -
including many that might have once been considered "acts of 
war" - by "peaceful means." Similarly, Article 2(4) requires all 
members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state .... " 
The Charter does, however, allow signatories to use force in 
certain limited circumstances. In addition to actions specifically 
authorized by the Security Council, unilateral use of armed force 
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is permitted in self-defense. Specifically, Article 51 of the 
Charter allows force to be used in self-defense "if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations .... " 
[Emphasis added.] The issue then is whether the use of a com-
puter virus equate to an "armed" attack within the meaning of 
Article 51. 
This is a good illustration of where technology is, perhaps, 
ahead of international law. Although computer viruses can wreak 
havoc on advanced societies like that of the United States, such 
"attacks" - at least the economically-oriented one described in 
this scenario - do not as yet equate to an "armed" attack within 
the meaning of the UN Charter. As a general rule, "armed" 
attacks justifying an Article 51 response are largely limited to a 
significant assault using traditional kinds of weapons. 
In the 1986 decision in Nicaragua v. United States, for 
example, the International Court of Justice concluded that 
Nicaragua's support for rebels in various Central American 
countries did not justify the "armed" response (i.e., mining 
Nicaraguan harbors and other covert actions) by the United 
States. 
Further support for the proposition that an "armed" attack 
warranting an Article 51 response does not include cyberassaults 
can be found by examining the Charter as a whole. In its outline 
of actions to be taken against recalcitrant nations, it seems to 
distinguish between acts constituting "armed" operations and 
lesser coercive maneuvers. Article 41, for example, discusses 
"measures not involving the use of armed force" and cites as 
examples the "complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication .... " [Emphasis added.] 
Analogizing such tactics to a computer virus assault that 
causes a "complete" or "partial interruption" of the electronic 
communication of economic information is not difficult. Thus, it 
appears that the use of a computer virus probably does not per se 
constitute an "armed" attack under the Charter and Article 51 
would not justify the proposed military strikes. Indeed, such 
military action, notwithstanding the virus invasion, might 
constitute "aggression" - a serious allegation in the post-
Nuremberg world. 
Some scholars argue, however, that the true meaning of 
"armed attack" under Article 51 relates to the "intensity of the 
coercion" imposed. Thus, it might be argued that where the 
economic damage caused by the electronic attack is of sufficient 
scale and scope, then the coercion equates to "armed attack" 
justifying an Article 51 response. 
This argument is somewhat stronger, however, if the nature 
of the cyberattack was different, e.g., if a computer virus let loose 
by the hostile nation infected all kinds of computer systems, not 
just economic ones like the stock exchange. If, for example, a 
virus destroyed the computer controlling the power grid or the 
telephone system serving a major urban area, hundreds if not 
thousands of innocent civilians could die (e.g., elderly people 
could freeze to death, emergency 911 calls would be blocked, 
etc.). 
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Under such circumstances, clear evidence of reasonably 
foreseeable deaths directly attributable to the "attack," it might be 
possible to equate a computer virus assault with an "armed" 
attack as used in Article 51. Indeed, most experts would agree 
that where data manipulation directly results in significant 
destructive effects that are indistinguishable in any meaningful 
way from those caused by traditional (kinetic) weapons, such 
assaults constitute "armed attacks" for purposes of Article 51. 
Even if the particular action does not warrant a military 
response under Article 51, this does not mean that the United 
States would be without recourse. Domestic criminal law may 
apply, and the U.S. could take the matter to the Security Council 
or other international fora for resolution. The Security Council 
could authorize military force against offending state even in the 
absence of an "armed attack." The requirement for an "armed 
attack" applies only to the authority to engage in self-defense 
pursuant to Article 51. 
Furthermore, just because a particular cyberassault does not 
authorize a military strike does not mean it is legal under interna-
tional law. A whole range of international agreements may be 
violated. The doctrine of state responsibility holds that every 
breach of international law creates a duty to pay for any loss or 
damage that results. 
Moreover, an important new study by Commander James N. 
Bond of the Naval War College asserts that victims of an unlawful 
cyberattack that does not amount to a use of force may take 
proportional countermeasures that also do not amount to a use of 
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"force." He maintains that one such response might be a "tit-for-
tat" data manipulation. 
All of this suggests a need to establish an international 
consensus as to the meaning and consequences of cyberattacks. 
One obvious method of qualifying cyberassaults as "armed 
attacks" is to simply define electronic methodologies as "weap-
ons." In this respect a 1974 UN resolution defined the "use of 
any weapons by a State against the territory of another State" as 
"aggression." The United States, however, should approach such 
proposals with caution. They may result in unintended limita-
tions when applied to the range of emerging new technologies. 
While the U.S. has many vulnerabilities to cyberassault, it also 
has great potential capability. 
Nevertheless, as the world becomes more cybernetically 
dependent, real lives become at risk in the 'virtual' environment. 
Moreover, corrupting the vast databases of industry the Federal 
government can easily do as much damage as the physical 
destruction that dozens of enemy bombers could wreak. The 
United States needs to be able to deter the specter of such assaults 
by all means at its disposal - including traditional military 
strikes. 
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